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ABSTRACT 
To sustain or repair cooperation, adaptive social creatures must understand the responses 
expected from social gestures and the consequences resulting when such norms are violated 
by accident or intent. We have applied this normative perspective to participants with a 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder (BPD) playing a mathematically portrayed multi-
round exchange game with a healthy partner. Subjects with BPD showed a profound incapacity 
to maintain cooperation, and they were impaired in their capacity to repair it based on a 
quantitative measure of coaxing. In a separate experiment, an adaptive computer agent, 
designed to play the game like a BPD subject, provided strong evidence that BPD subjects 
cause the break in cooperation. Healthy subjects showed a strong linear relationship between 
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their partner’s offer level and the response of the anterior insular cortex – a region known to 
respond to norm violations across a number of dimensions. In contrast, BPD subjects’ anterior 
insula did not differentiate offer levels despite displaying the same average response. These 
neural and behavioral data suggest that social exchange norms in BPD subjects are 
pathologically perturbed or missing altogether. This game-theoretic approach to 
psychopathology may open doors to new ways of characterizing and understanding a range of 
mental illnesses.  
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Theoretical and empirical work on cooperation has made tremendous strides by using game 
theory to provide a normative mathematical setting for understanding social exchange (1-7). 
This same game-theoretic framework has exposed some of the basic computations underlying 
social interaction and identified neural correlates of cooperation, reciprocity, and social signaling 
(8-22). Collectively, this work raises the possibility of a new approach to characterizing and 
understanding psychopathology from a normative perspective. In conditions ranging from 
psychosis to developmental and personality disorders, afflicted individuals often display a 
dramatically perturbed capacity to model others and to sense and respond appropriately to the 
social signals they emit (23-25). Consequently, using normative game-theoretic probes of social 
signaling in identified psychopathologies offers the opportunity to understand some of the 
components of these disorders in terms of malfunctioning computations (26, 27).  
 
In this paper, we selected subjects based on their capacity to maintain stable interpersonal 
relationships and used a multi-round economic exchange game (Fig. 1A) to probe two 
fundamental components underlying the capacity to sustain a successful social exchange: 
cooperation and its repair. Specifically, we studied a group of control individuals and a second 
group of individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (BPD), a psychiatric disorder 
characterized by unstable relationships, affective dysregulation, and a general incapacity to trust 
appropriately the actions and (possible) motives of others (28, 29)  
 
Successful cooperation between two agents requires a range of intact computations including 
the capacity to sense and to value social gestures exchanged with one’s partner (30-32), as well 
as respond with strategies that promote individual and/or shared goals. However, such 
cooperative exchange is fragile, and can easily be ruptured whether by accident (e.g., through 
impoverished models of social partners) or intent (33). Successful repair of broken cooperation 
in an iterated exchange requires the capacity to coax one’s partner back into cooperation 
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through the medium of generous gestures (33-39). In an economic exchange game, such 
gestures are encoded as money units thus exposing their immediate cost to each subject. 
However, for such gestures to be meaningful, cooperating individuals must possess correct 
fairness norms for what is expected from them and their partners, and they must sense when 
these norms have been significantly violated (40, 41). In this paper, we pursued the hypothesis 
that social exchange norms of subjects with borderline personality disorder are either 
pathologically perturbed or missing altogether, thus preventing sustained cooperation or its 
repair after it breaks down.  
  
Before scanning, all participants (healthy subject group and BPD group) underwent diagnostic 
and symptom assessment, and were matched on demographic variables including sex, age, 
education and verbal IQ (see Table S1 and SOM). Within each trust exchange, cooperation 
occurs when an investor and trustee act in a manner that mutually benefits both players. For 
example, if an investor sends $20 to a trustee and the trustee splits the tripled investment ($60) 
with the investor, both the investor and trustee profit. The investor earns $10 more, and the 
trustee earns $30 more, than if the investor had sent nothing. However, if a trustee does not 
repay at least the amount invested, the investor accrues no benefit from the exchange, likely 
triggering smaller subsequent investments. Thus, increased cooperation is seen with increased 
money exchanged across the course of the 10-round game. In the current study, subjects 
diagnosed with BPD played the trustee role against a healthy investor; as expected, each game 
began normally with the healthy investor showing a level of trust comparable to that of healthy 
investors playing healthy trustees (Fig. 1A and SOM). 
 
Individuals with BPD send signals that break cooperation. In early rounds of this multi-
round game, investment levels did not differ between subjects partnered with BPD trustees and 
subjects partnered with healthy trustees. However, in late rounds of the game, investments 
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were significantly lower for dyads with a BPD trustee relative to control dyads with a healthy 
trustee (Fig. 1B). This definitive downward shift in investment levels for dyads with BPD 
trustees reflects a break in cooperation (see fig. S2 for round-by-round summary of the 
same data and footnote 1 for regression analysis of dyadic interaction). We strongly 
suspected that this breakdown was caused by the social signals emitted by the BPD trustee and 
were not due to a sampling of healthy investors that happened to be uncooperative. To test this 
claim empirically, we developed two adaptive computer agents - one that played the multi-round 
trust game like a BPD trustee and one that played like a healthy trustee (method illustrated in 
Fig. 1B). In a separate within-subject experimental design, healthy investors played each 
computer agent (n=68; Fig. 1C). To account for learning effects, this large group of investors 
was split into two groups and counterbalanced over which computer agent (healthy or BPD) the 
human investor played first (SOM). As shown in Fig. 1C, the healthy computer trustee elicited 
investment levels consistent with data collected from two healthy interacting humans in Fig. 1A. 
However, the BPD-like computer agent elicited significantly lower levels of cooperation in the 
same investors. This separate set of experiments strongly suggests that the rupture in 
cooperation shown in Fig. 1A is due to the signals emitted by the BPD subjects rather than 
being an artifact contingent on some other unidentified variable. 
 
Coaxing pays and BPD subjects do it much less frequently. Although the BPD subjects 
showed a consistent tendency to rupture cooperation with their healthy partners, the issue of 
broken cooperation arises during all interpersonal exchange. Individuals bring to any two-party 
interaction variability in their fairness norms, variable sensitivities to deviations from these 
norms, and variable responses to these deviations. These issues highlight a feature that 
plagues all social exchange – breakdowns in cooperation are common, and successful social 
agents must sense (or even anticipate) these failures and select actions to repair them (33-39). 
Consequently, we specifically sought to identify strategic responses to cooperation breakdowns 
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that allow healthy trustees to maintain high levels of cooperation into the later rounds of the 
exchange. We focused on rounds in which cooperation was low, that is, rounds in which 
investments of $5 or less were made. Low investments act as a viable proxy for broken 
cooperation because in this economic exchange game and other related games (1, 10, 13, 15, 
16, 42), opening investments to a responder (here the trustee) are typically large. For 
investments to become small, a responder has to ‘prove’ that they are not worthy of a large offer 
by acting in an untrustworthy manner. However, such circumstances offer the trustee an 
opportunity to repair the broken cooperation. If trustees repay a large fraction of the tripled 
investment, they signal their trustworthiness in the presence of low offers and may garner 
greater investments on subsequent rounds (Fig. 2A). We term this behavior ‘coaxing’ and show 
in Fig. 2B that coaxing pays dividends for 4 rounds into the future. In this same figure, we 
summarize the results for low offers when the trustees do not coax – there is no future payback. 
So in the context of this multi-round game, coaxing repairs cooperation and pays off generously 
for the coaxer. Remarkably, comparison of healthy trustees to BPD trustees found healthy 
players to be almost twice as likely as BPD players to coax in the presence of low offers (i.e., 
repay a third or more of the investment; Fig. 2C).  
 
BPD subjects have perturbed norm deviation responses in their insular cortex. These 
behavioral data with humans and computer agents suggest strongly that BPD subjects emit 
responses that cause cooperation to rupture, and, once ruptured, they show substantially 
diminished rates of coaxing (generous gestures) to repair the break (Fig. 2C). A question 
naturally arises about whether there is a comprehensible and consistent neural correlate of the 
rupture in cooperation that serves to cue the repair (or not) of cooperation. To investigate the 
possible neural origins of failures in cooperation and the lack of coaxing, we first sought neural 
responses in healthy trustee brains that were stronger in response to the revelation of small 
investments than to the revelation of large investments. Identified regions included bilateral 
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anterior insula, medial frontal gyrus, bilateral inferior parietal lobule (BA 40), and left inferior 
frontal gyrus (see table S3). In contrast to these findings in healthy subjects, no regions were 
significantly related to investment size among individuals with borderline personality disorder. In 
earlier work using this same multi-round trust game (13) and single-shot ultimatum games (19), 
small offers increase the probability of defection in the partner and such behavior is preceded by 
increased activity in the anterior insular cortex (also see (43) for review). Consequently, we 
pursued a region of interest analysis of the anterior insular cortex (Fig. 3). A dramatic difference 
emerged between healthy trustees and BPD subjects. In healthy subjects, there was a strong 
linear relationship between the size of the offer sent by the investor and the response of the 
anterior insular cortex. In BPD subjects, the insular cortex was activated at the same level 
across all investment levels, suggesting that their brains either perceive all offers as threatening 
(like a low offer) or that they simply cannot differentiate the intended meaning of different offer 
levels (see discussion). 
 
Discussion 
 
Using a ten-round iterated exchange of trust and event-related fMRI, we tracked breakdowns in 
cooperation in a large cohort of 78 pairs of subjects, composed of one group of healthy social 
agents (n = 36 pairs) and another group of individuals with borderline personality disorder (n = 
42 pairs), a psychiatric illness characterized by an inability to maintain stable interpersonal 
relationships. In healthy subject pairs, we find that when cooperation fails, norm-violation 
responses in the anterior insula are observed (Fig. 3), and cooperative exchange is restored 
through a behavioral mechanism of cooperation repair that we here labeled coaxing (Fig. 2A). 
In contrast to healthy trustees, we find that BPD subjects emit signals that result in a rupture in 
cooperation (Fig. 1C), and they display a significantly diminished cooperation-repair response of 
coaxing (half the rate of healthy subjects (Fig. 2C). The mitigated coaxing response in BPD 
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subjects is significant because such coaxing behavior effectively reestablishes cooperation (Fig. 
2B). Furthermore, coaxing in the context of this game is consistent with the generous or 
forgiving strategies identified by evolutionary simulations of cooperative exchange, as well as 
previous empirical results of iterated prisoner’s dilemma games (33-39). 
 
Using two adaptive computer agents and a separate large cohort of healthy investors (n = 68), 
we showed that the behavioral signal distributions emitted by BPD subjects were sufficient on 
their own to disrupt cooperation while a similar computer agent playing like a healthy trustee 
maintained cooperation with its partner (Fig. 1C). But the most telling neural feature observed in 
the BPD group was the lack of an insular response that differentiated offer levels, yet displayed 
the same average activation level as healthy trustees across all offer levels (Fig. 3). While the 
insular cortex has traditionally been associated with pain perception and representation (44, 45), 
responses in the anterior insula have recently been identified in social interactions where norms 
are violated (19, 21, 46, 47). In an ultimatum game, in which one player offers to split an 
endowment with a second player, small offers are perceived as unfair and typically refused (1, 
48, 49). In such instances, anterior insula activity both scales negatively with offer size and 
predicts whether the offer is subsequently rejected (19). In a related finding, anterior insula 
activity of observers is greater when a punishment is applied to players perceived as fair relative 
to players perceived as unfair (20). In non-social tasks, activity in the anterior insula has been 
found to encode representations of risk and uncertainty about decision outcomes (50-56). The 
association of the insula with a representation of outcome variance suggests that the insula may 
encode the distribution of likely outcomes in social interactions, that is, responses in the anterior 
insula may indicate social norm violations within interpersonal contexts. Furthermore, violations 
of such norms could serve as control signals that update expectations about social partners or 
at least inform learning about a subset of parameters associated with one’s partner. This 
possibility is supported by the work of Preuschoff and Bossaerts who have recently reported 
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prediction errors of risk to evoke strong responses in the bilateral anterior insula, consistent with 
this speculation (55-57).   
 
Taken together, these data support the hypothesis that the strong negative relationship between 
offer size and activity in the anterior insula seen among healthy trustees reflects the perceived 
violation of social norms in the two-party trust exchange. The apparent insensitivity of the BPD 
subjects’ insula to offer level size suggests two possibilities along these lines: 1) monetary 
reward is not reinforcing to individuals with BPD; or, 2) low offers are not perceived to be a 
violation of social norms to individuals with BPD. Previous work has shown monetary reward to 
be a potent reinforcer in natural and laboratory settings in this group (58), making the former 
less likely. Furthermore, studies of interpersonal and emotional processing in BPD suggest that 
this group holds negative expectations of social partners and exhibits negative evaluative biases 
(59, 60), consistent with the presence of atypical social norms.  
 
To compare social norms of healthy trustees to BPD trustees within the current study, a self-
report measure of trust (61) was used to gauge expectations across a variety of social situations 
and with a variety of social agents. Individuals with BPD expressed significantly lower levels of 
self-reported trust relative to healthy controls (p < .001; Fig. 4), a finding that agrees with the 
diminished trust exhibited by this group on the economic exchange. Together, these results 
suggest that the diminished insula response to low offers does indeed reflect atypical social 
norms in this group. Put another way, the low offers from social partners do not violate the 
social expectations of individuals with BPD, accounting for the diminished insula response in the 
BPD group.  
 
While a number of studies have utilized resting-state and emotional challenge paradigms to 
investigate personality disorders, the current study represents the first large-scale investigation 
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of interpersonal behavior among individuals diagnosed with an Axis-II psychiatric disorder using 
a normative exchange game. The critical role that interpersonal deficits play across a variety of 
such disorders, along with the substantive contribution that neuroimaging studies have made in 
elucidating the etiology of Axis-I disorders, recommend future imaging studies of active social 
exchanges between individuals with and without social pathologies (26, 27, 62). 
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Figure Legends 
 
Fig. 1. Cooperation fails across rounds when individuals with BPD engage in a repeated 
exchange of trust. 
 
(A) Cooperation across 10-round trust game. Investors are endowed with $20 at the start of 
each of 10 rounds. Investors can invest any portion of the endowment with their partner. The 
invested amount is tripled before being passed to the trustee, who can repay any portion of the 
tripled investment. Roles are kept constant for all rounds of the game. Trustees accrue earnings 
during each round by keeping a portion of the tripled investment, while investors accrue 
earnings both by the portion of the original endowment kept, as well as any repayments made 
by their partner. For additional details of the experimental design, see fig. S1, table S1 and 
SOM. Among 36 healthy investors (gray) paired with healthy trustees (gray), investments were 
large and sustained across early (1-5) rounds and late (6-10) rounds of the game. However, 
among 42 healthy investors (gray) paired with 42 trustees with borderline personality disorder 
(BPD; red), a decrease in investment level from early to late rounds of the game indicates a 
failure in cooperation across the iterated exchange. Mean percent invested and SEM are 
plotted. 
 
(B) Adaptive computer trustee. Decisions of the adaptive computer partners were generated 
using a k-nearest neighbors sampling algorithm. Specifically, choices of a ‘computer trustee’ 
were generated by: (a) identifying interactions within a database of 10-round trust game 
behavior that are similar (i.e., 7 dyads in the database with smallest Euclidean distance from the 
vector of 5 previous choices – last 3 investments and last 2 repayments) and then (b) randomly 
sampling from the distribution of next repayments of those nearest neighbors in order to 
generate ‘computer trustee’ choices  In doing so, ‘computer trustees’ behave as average 
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healthy human trustees when sampling from the healthy database (n = 36), and behave as 
average BPDs when sampling from a database of BPD dyads (n = 42). 
 
(C) To confirm that the break in cooperation observed in late rounds among BPD dyads can be 
accounted for by behavioral signals sent by BPD players, a separate cohort of healthy investors 
(n = 68) played two adaptive computer trustees in a within-subject design. In one condition, 
healthy investors played  0 rounds with a ‘healthy’ computer trustee; in a second condition, the 
same investor played 10 rounds with a ‘ PD’ computer trustee  The order of play was 
counterbalanced, and the effect of ‘computer trustee’ type on level of cooperation (mean 
investment ± SEM) is depicted. Consistent with results depicted in Fig. 1A, we found BPD 
‘computer trustee’ behavior elicited lower levels of cooperation than healthy ‘computer trustee’ 
behavior within the same human investors. 
  
Fig. 2. 
 
(A) Coaxing by trustee engenders trust from investors. Cooperation within the iterated trust 
game is expressed as high levels of investment combined with equitable sharing of investment 
returns (see fig. S2 for normative behavior). When cooperation falters (i.e., when investments 
are low), trustees can rebuild trust and cooperation by ‘coaxing’ back higher and higher 
investment levels. In this schematic representation, the investor entrusts only a small portion of 
their endowment ($5 of $20 points) to their partner. The $15 received by the trustee is far less 
than the $60 that would have been received if the investor had sent the entire endowment. 
Thus, in order to maximize their gains, a trustee must induce cooperation in a repeated 
exchange. The trustee can coax back trust from their partner by repaying a large proportion of 
the tripled investment -- signaling their own trustworthiness and thus eliciting larger subsequent 
investments. Conversely, if the trustee does not coax and instead keeps a large proportion of 
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the tripled investment, the investor is likely to invest less on subsequent rounds and cooperation 
will continue to devolve. 
 
(B) Coaxing pays off. The effect of such coaxing is summarized in the effect of repayment on 
investments in subsequent rounds. This analysis is restricted to low investments (all rounds with 
investments <$5). Gray bars depict mean ± SE investment level following small repayments 
(repayment less than  /3 of the tripled investment; ‘no coax’ condition), while red bars depict 
investment level following large repayments (more than or equal to  /3; ‘coax’ condition)  The 
analysis indicates that coaxing elicits larger investments in rounds following coaxing behavior 
(red) than for rounds following no coaxing (gray). Note that the coaxing-related increase in 
investment persists across rounds, such that a large repayment in the current round earns 
larger investment up to 4 rounds into the future. 
 
(C) BPDs coax less. Healthy trustees are twice as likely as BPD trustees to coax when 
cooperation between players is low. Specifically, healthy trustees are more likely to make a 
large repayment (≥ investment amount) after having received a small investment (≤ $ )  
Conversely, BPD trustees are more likely to make a small repayment (< investment amount) 
after receiving a small investment. The y-axis indicates the proportion of exchanges that 
trustees repay more than or equal to the investment amount after receiving a small investment 
(≤ $ )  
 
Fig. 3. Response of 36 healthy trustee brains and 42 BPD trustee brains to level of cooperation. 
 
Top panel: A general linear model (GLM) analysis identified four cortical regions with greater 
response to small investments relative to large investments (I ≤ $ , n =  0  rounds; I > $10, n = 
125 rounds). These regions included bilateral anterior insula (top left), medial frontal gyrus, 
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bilateral inferior parietal lobule (BA 40), and left inferior frontal gyrus (p < .001 uncorrected in 
yellow; p < .005 in orange; see table S3). A region-of-interest analysis in the left insula of 
healthy trustees indicates response in the left insula of trustees scales negatively with the size 
of investment (r = -.96; top right). Percent change in BOLD signal was averaged from the 10 
most significant voxels identified in the GLM during the 4-8 second period following the 
revelation of investment. The mean ± SE of the resulting signal is plotted in $4 bins. In contrast, 
similar analyses among 42 individuals with BPD showed no increased activation in these 
regions when investments were small. 
 
Fig. 4. Behavioral and self-report levels of trust indicate perturbed social norms among 
individuals with BPD.  
 
Left panel: Individuals with BPD report lower trait levels of trust using a self-report measure 
(Interpersonal Trust Scale; (61)). Right panel: Individuals with BPD repay less than the healthy 
group, indicated lower levels of trust within the exchange game (also see fig. S2). 
 
 
